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Executive summary and feedback request  
This document updates estimates, previously adopted by EUROCONTROL, of the cost of passenger 
delay to European airlines. It draws on various sources of evidence, with a particular focus on the 
impact of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, which establishes the rules for compensation and assistance 
to airline passengers in the event of denied boarding, cancellation or delay. It reviews major legal 
rulings on the Regulation to assess the broader cost impacts on airlines. It also assesses changes to 
the Regulation being considered by the European Commission, in order to ensure that the cost 
framework used for these delay cost calculations is sufficiently adaptable to such changes and to gain 
an insight into the likely future regulatory emphasis, particularly where this has a financial implication 
for airlines. The objective is to produce cost reference values for industry use, which accurately reflect 
airline delay costs. These are produced for 15 aircraft types1, across a range of delay durations, 
according to ‘low’, ‘base’ and ‘high’ cost scenarios, for the year 2014. 
The Regulation 261 revision process remains far from complete. The European Parliament will 
negotiate with the European Council (EU member states), after the latter has reached agreement on a 
common position; meanwhile industry views are amongst those being taken into consideration before 
adoption of the revised Regulation. 
Endogenous factors in scope in this report thus include changes to the regulatory context, both those 
effected through settled case law since the implementation of the Regulation and planned changes to 
the rules in coming years, and also changes in the rate of complaints. Increasing awareness of 
Regulation 261 is likely to drive up claim rates to airlines and thus increase the cost of a given 
disruption. Studies regarding the enforcement of the Regulation have shown gradual but slow 
improvements over time, although many member states still do not enforce the Regulation effectively. 
Exogenous factors in scope include aircraft seating densities and load factors, inflation and changes 
in air transport market conditions. 
Since the objective is to model the cost of delay for given aircraft delays, changes in performance 
(e.g. regarding delays) are out of scope, although these affect net airline costs. Court rulings that are 
likely to generate retrospective claims are not specifically modelled, as these do not directly impact 
future delay costs (apart from indirect, strategic effects). Similarly, the extent to which airlines absorb 
such costs strategically is not quantified, although these effects may be considerable and may need 
to be accounted for in future. 
Although the passenger cost of delay is often a dominating delay cost for operators, it is concluded 
that there remains incomplete quantitative evidence supporting the calculation thereof. The published 
literature on such costs and factors likely to influence them (indirectly) are examined, including a 
European Commission Impact Assessment published in 2013, focusing on Regulation 261, although 
the extent to which quantitative inputs can be used from other reporting methods to update the values 
previously adopted by EUROCONTROL is very limited. Ultimately, for both the passenger hard and 
soft costs of delay to the airline, simple inflationary increases have been applied to the 2010 costs, in 
parallel to updated seat, load factor and passenger allocations for the 15 aircraft types considered. 
The values presented here are statistical (probabilistic) results, suitable for use as reference values. 
Further research is required to provide a more robust estimate of such costs as a function of delay 
duration and aircraft type. Until such systematic research is implemented, airline feedback on the 
values presented is particularly useful, and invited herewith. Other airline delay costs, relating to fuel, 
maintenance, crew and fleet provisions are more readily quantifiable from (published) data sources, 
and are being reported upon separately. 
                                                     
1 Three of these, viz. the DH8D, E190 and A332, were not included in the original set of aircraft evaluated, and thus extend the 
range of reported costs. 
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Why evidence-based feedback is important  
The table below presents the total costs of passenger delay to the airlines, by delay duration and 
aircraft type, for the base cost scenario, in 2014-Euros. (It is a copy of Table 12, presented at the end 
of the calculations which follow.) Compared with the previously reported values for 2010, the average 




Total cost of passenger delay by delay duration and aircraft type (base cost scenario)  
Delay 
(mins) 
5 15 30 60 90 120 180 240 300 
B733 40 250 910 3 320 6 800 11 110 22 180 36 370 53 520 
B734 40 290 1 040 3 780 7 750 12 670 25 280 41 470 61 020 
B735 30 230 810 2 950 6 040 9 860 19 690 32 290 47 510 
B738 40 330 1 170 4 250 8 700 14 220 28 390 46 570 68 520 
B752 50 400 1 420 5 180 10 610 17 340 34 610 56 770 83 520 
B763 70 490 1 760 6 420 13 150 21 490 42 900 70 360 103 530 
B744 110 790 2 850 10 360 21 220 34 670 69 220 113 530 167 050 
A319 40 270 960 3 510 7 180 11 730 23 420 38 410 56 520 
A320 40 310 1 110 4 030 8 260 13 500 26 940 44 190 65 020 
A321 50 380 1 350 4 900 10 040 16 400 32 750 53 710 79 020 
AT43 10 90 310 1 120 2 290 3 740 7 460 12 240 18 010 
AT72 20 120 440 1 610 3 300 5 400 10 780 17 680 26 010 
DH8D 20 140 490 1 770 3 620 5 920 11 810 19 380 28 510 
E190 30 180 660 2 390 4 890 7 990 15 960 26 170 38 510 
A332 80 550 1 980 7 200 14 740 24 080 48 080 78 860 116 030 
 
These results will be used to develop European reference values for use by industry and in wider 
research, updating previously published values adopted by EUROCONTROL. The Performance 
Review commission of EUROCONTROL has used such findings in the past, and is likely to do so 
again in the future. 
Since it is further intended that this methodology, and these values, will be taken forward for use in 
operational contexts (such as dynamic cost indexing for delay recovery), it is equally important that 
the delay costs neither under- nor over-estimate actual airline costs, to the best possible extent.  
For example, it is clear that over-estimation of such costs may lead to inappropriately high fuel burn to 
recover delay. Under-estimation may lead to inadequate investment to mitigate such costs 
strategically, for example through new technologies or simply by adding buffer to schedules. 
 
~*~ 
Feedback on the delay cost values presented in this document is invited, particularly from airlines. All 
feedback will be treated in confidence and suggestions for evidence-based adjustments will be taken 
into account. We have intentionally offered a broad background to prompt similarly broad responses. 
Kindly respond in the first instance to: 
airspace-research@westminster.ac.uk 
by 02 October 2015. We would be happy to arrange a (further) discussion by telephone, as preferred. 
Thank you for your consideration.  
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1  The cost of passenger delay to European airlines 
1.1 Overview of cost types 
Three types of passenger costs of delay may be considered: 
 ‘hard’ costs: borne by the airline (measurable, bottom-line costs such as re-booking and 
compensation); 
 ‘soft’ costs: borne by the airline (such as loss of market share due to passenger 
dissatisfaction); 
 ‘internalised’ costs: borne by the passenger, not passed on to the airline (e.g. potential loss 
of business due to late arrival at meeting; partial loss of social activity2. 
We are concerned here only with costs impacting the airline, i.e. the first two types, although it should 
be noted that compensation due to passengers for delays and cancellations is, in principle, designed 
to offset the third type of cost (European Commission, 2013c). A fuller discussion of these cost types 
may be found in our previous reporting adopted by EUROCONTROL (Cook and Tanner, 2011).  
 
1.2 The European regulatory context 
Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (European Commission, 2004) establishes the rules for compensation 
and assistance to airline passengers in the event of denied boarding, cancellation or delay. This 
Regulation came into effect on 17 February 2005. The implementation of the Regulation across 
Europe is not consistent. Case law has a decisive impact on the interpretation and application of 
Regulation 261. European Court of Justice rulings are legally binding from the date that the relevant 
Regulation came into force, and all airlines are legally obliged to respect them (European 
Commission, 2013c). A number of national rulings have also impacted the interpretation and 
application of the Regulation, also mostly in terms of extending the scope in favour of the passenger. 
For a review, set also in a wider international context, see Correia and Rouissi (2015). 
Social and political priorities in Europe have shifted to further support passenger rights, as evidenced 
by high-level position documents such as ‘Flightpath 2050’ (European Commission, 2011b) and the 
European Commission’s 2011 White Paper (European Commission, 2011c)3. Several problems with 
regard to the implementation and scope of Regulation 261/2004 have been identified, with a roadmap 
for the revision of the Regulation published in late 2011 (European Commission, 2011d). 
1.2.1 Regulation 261 – original provisions, February 2005 
Figure 1 shows passenger entitlements as a function of delay duration, in a simplified form4. The 
length of haul terminologies are specified here for simplicity. Where ‘short haul’ is denoted in this 
report, the Regulation refers to flights of ≤ 1500 km; ‘medium haul’ relates to intra-EU flights of > 1500 
km and other flights of 1500-3500 km; ‘long haul’ relates to all other flights – i.e. non-intra-EU and > 
3500 km. The delays refer to departure delay. Hotel accommodation is also required if a delay 
necessitates an overnight stay. The right to care (e.g. provision of meals) also applies – as in cases of 
denied boarding or flight cancellation (but then only when the passenger pursues the delayed travel 
and opts for re-routing). Care is due even if the disruption is caused by “extraordinary circumstances”, 
since these only exempt operators from paying compensation (Rouissi and Correia (2014)5; European 
Commission (2013c)). 
 
                                                     
2 See also Lubbe and Victor (2012). For quantified values of time, see Cook and Tanner (2011) (Annex C) and Maibach et al. 
(2008), the latter used for reference by Commission services (European Commission, 2013c). 
3 The White Paper calls for a uniform interpretation of EU law on passenger rights and a harmonised and effective enforcement 
thereof. The consultation period for the mid-term review of the White Paper runs from 10MAR15 to 02JUN15: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/media/consultations/2015-white-paper-2011-midterm-review_en.htm 
4 See Article 7(2) of the Regulation, cited in Appendix A, for the literal terminology. 
5 Also published as Correia and Rouissi (2015). 
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Haul 
 Delay duration  
≥ 90 mins ≥ 2 hours ≥ 3 hours ≥ 4 hours ≥ 5 hours ≥ 8 hours 
Short haul     €250   €250     €250   
Medium haul     €400   €400     €400  
Long haul         €600   €600     €600  
  
Key 
  Care (e.g. reasonable meals and refreshments)   
  Reimbursement of ticket     
 
 
Figure 1. Original provisions of Regulation 261 
 
We review major rulings on the Regulation in order to be able to assess the cost impacts on airlines. 
We also summarise changes to the Regulation being considered by the European Commission, in 
order to ensure that our cost framework is sufficiently adaptable to such changes and to gain an 
insight into the likely future regulatory emphasis, particularly where this has a financial implication for 
airlines. 
1.2.2 Court of Justice ruling, November 2009 
In November 2009, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) gave its ruling in the joined 
cases of Sturgeon and Böck (CJEU, 20096). In these decisions, passengers arriving at the destination 
three hours or more after the scheduled arrival time were considered entitled to compensation unless 
the carrier could prove that the flight delay was caused by ‘extraordinary’ circumstances which could 
not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures were taken (Commission for Aviation 
Regulation, 2010). The CJEU’s judgment in the cases of TUI Travel and Nelson (CJEU, 2012a) 
handed down in October 2012 confirmed the ruling in the Sturgeon and Böck cases; therefore, a right 
to compensation when flights are delayed (not expressly set out in Regulation 261) as well as 
cancelled has been defined in Europe, as a matter of settled law (Commission for Aviation 
Regulation, 2013). The Court of Justice found that passengers experiencing delay flights should be 
treated in the same way as those whose flights are cancelled, as regards their right to compensation 
(CJEU, 2012b), since the impacts of arrival delay on the passenger are not substantially different. 
 
Haul 
 Delay duration  
≥ 90 mins ≥ 2 hours ≥ 3 hours ≥ 4 hours ≥ 5 hours ≥ 8 hours 
Short haul     €250   €250     €250   
Medium haul     €400   €400     €400  
Long haul          €300*   €600     €600  
  
Key 
  Care (e.g. reasonable meals and refreshments)  black: 2005 
  Reimbursement of ticket    blue: 2009 
€ Compensation (refers to arrival delay) 
 * For delays of 3 to 4 hours (see Paragraph 63 of CJEU ruling in Annex 1) 
 
 
Figure 2. Improved passenger rights as a function of delay duration 
                                                     
6 See also extracts of this important ruling, as set out in Annex 1. 
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Unlike the original Regulation 261 provision, these compensation rights refer to arrival delay. The 
compensation values shown in Figure 2 are as cited in European Commission (2014b) and are 
aligned with Article 7 of Regulation 261 (European Commission, 2004).  
The continuing lack of clarity regarding exactly which circumstances may be deemed ‘extraordinary’ is 
reflected in a non-binding, draft list of such circumstances posted by the European Commission 
(2013a) following a National Enforcement Bodies meeting in April 2013, and in national rulings such 
as a case concerning Jet2, confirming that technical faults, such as component failure caused by 
wear and tear, did not count as ‘extraordinary’ and were not exempt from the Regulation (England 
and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions, 2014a). Jet2 was later refused appeal by the 
United Kingdom’s Supreme Court (UK Supreme Court, 2014). 
 
1.2.3 Court of Justice ruling, September 2014 
In September 2014, the Court of Justice (CJEU) made a ruling on Case C‑452/13 regarding the 
definition of the arrival time of a flight. The ruling was made that: “Articles 2, 5 and 7 of Regulation 
(EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing 
common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of 
cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, must be interpreted 
as meaning that the concept of ‘arrival time’, which is used to determine the length of the delay to 
which passengers on a flight have been subject, refers to the time at which at least one of the doors 
of the aircraft is opened, the assumption being that, at that moment, the passengers are permitted to 
leave the aircraft.” (CJEU, 2014). This resolved previous ambiguities, and established arrival time as 
significantly later than other options considered, such as touchdown or in-block time.  
1.2.4 UK Supreme Court ruling, October 2014 
The England and Wales Court of Appeal, in a case concerning Thomson, ruled in June 2014 that 
compensation should be made available for delays to flights within a period of up to six years after the 
event (England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions, 2014b.) The legal issue was 
whether the applicable limitation period for bringing a claim for compensation under the Regulation 
should be two years (pursuant to the Montreal Convention7), or six years (pursuant to the Limitation 
Act 19808). An appeal from Thomson was rejected by the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court (UK 
Supreme Court, 2014). This prompted media speculation that airlines would experience a substantial 
number of retrospective claims (Toogood, 2014.). This does not impact these calculations, however, 
where the objective is to assign delay costs to (future) aircraft delays.  
1.2.5 Regulation 261 – planned revisions 
The European Parliament identified a need for enhanced legal certainty and a more uniform 
application of European regulations in terms of passenger rights. A consultation on the potential 
revision of Regulation 261 was completed in March 2012, though with little consensus on the way 
forward, with responses from airlines and consumer/passenger organisations often directly opposed 
(European Commission, 2012b). On 29 March 2012, the European Parliament made a resolution on 
the functioning and application of established rights of people travelling by air (2011/2150(INI9); 
European Parliament, 2012a) trying to maximise passenger awareness of their rights and simplify and 
facilitate the complaint process. This resolution was followed by another on the 23 October 2012 on 
passenger rights in all transport modes (2012/2067(INI); European Parliament, 2012b). 
                                                     
7 Regulation 2027/97 translates the Montreal Convention into EU law, making provisions with regard to compensation where 
baggage has been mishandled (European Commission, 2013c). The Montreal Convention is concerned with individualised 
damage to travellers, assessed on a case-by-case basis, with proof of burden on the passenger, and has no provisions with 
regard to denied boarding or cancellation. In theory, it provides a right to compensation in the event of delay, but the burden of 
proof issue, combined with the existence of Regulation 261, has resulted in relatively few successful claims (ibid.). 
8 This refers to an Act of Parliament that applies in England and Wales with regard to timescales within which action may be 
taken for breaches of law. The time limit for actions founded on simple contract “shall not be brought after the expiration of six 
years from the date on which the cause of action accrued”. 
9 INI = ‘own-initiative procedure’. 
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2011/2150(INI) (ibid.) advocates a greater improvement of passenger knowledge of the Regulation 
(i.e. implementation of effective complaint systems; information detailing passenger rights 
communicated by air carriers and tour operators, in the language used during the booking of the 
ticket; continuing the information campaign launched in 2010 to raise passengers’ awareness of their 
rights and to update all sources of information that set out the rights of passengers, such as websites, 
documents and brochures). 2012/2067(INI) (ibid.) extends this passenger awareness to all transport 
modes (i.e. it welcomes the Commission’s decision to maintain its information campaign on 
passenger rights up to 2014 and recommends that national consumer protection authorities and travel 
agencies should be involved in the campaign, suggesting that the list of rights common to all modes 
should be circulated widely, in a concise form and in all official EU languages; it also calls on carriers 
to provide information on passenger rights on travel tickets, especially contact details for help and 
assistance). 
On 30 May 2012, the Commission and the European Economic and Social Committee co-organised a 
conference presenting the main results of its consultation, giving stakeholders the opportunity to 
respond to the results (European Commission, 2013c). Consumer and passenger representatives 
mainly focused on inadequate enforcement (especially in the case of the rights to financial 
compensation in case of delay) and poor compliance. Regarding airlines and their associations (ibid.), 
these bodies: 
[…] mainly considered that the financial cost of the Regulation is excessive, particularly that airlines face unlimited liability for 
incidents which are not their fault (e.g. volcanic ash cloud crisis in April 2010). The airlines heavily criticised the consequences 
of the Sturgeon judgement – i.e. the right to financial compensation in case of long delay – on the grounds of alleged 
incompatibility with international law and excessive economic "burden". 
In March 2013, a memo was released by the Commission (European Commission, 2013b) detailing 
the key proposed changes to clarify legal grey areas and introducing new rights. In February 2014, 
the following proposed strengthening of air passenger rights passed its first reading in the European 
Parliament (European Commission, 2014a): 
 Enforcement: strengthening the oversight of airlines by national and European authorities, 
with more effective sanctions; 
 Right to care: introduction of a right to care for passengers after a delay of two hours, for all 
flights irrespective of distance (thereby removing the current dependency on flight distance); 
 Complaint handling: the introduction of a common complaint form; ensuring that 
passengers have a right to receive an acknowledgement within a week and a response to 
their complaint within two months (currently no time limit); 
 Right to information: ensuring passengers have a right to information about their situation 
30 minutes after a scheduled departure (currently no time limit); contact points in airports to 
inform passengers on the circumstances of their travel disruption and their rights; 
 Re-routing: ensuring passengers have a right to be re-routed by another airline or transport 
mode in case of cancellation when the carrier cannot re-route on its own services; 
Parliament additionally suggested a lower limit of 8 hours compared with 12 hours proposed 
by the Commission; 
 Connecting flights: clarifying that rights to assistance and compensation apply if 
connecting flights are missed because the previous flight was delayed by at least 90 
minutes; 
 Other rights: the right for passengers to correct spelling mistakes in their name without 
charge and giving national authorities enforcement powers over lost luggage rules. 
The European Parliament’s proposals also go further than those proposed by the Commission in 
strengthening air passenger rights (ibid.): 
 Compensation for delays (short and medium flights): the Parliament proposes a three 
hour delay threshold for compensation10. In contrast, the Commission considers a five hour 
threshold to be in passengers’ best interests, with a longer delay threshold reducing the 
financial incentive on airlines to cancel delayed flights to avoid paying compensation, and 
instead make every effort to repair technical problems and operate flights. 
                                                     
10 This is consistent with the Court of Justice of the European Union ruling in the joined cases of Sturgeon and Böck discussed 
above (CJEU, 2009). 
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 Extraordinary circumstances: the Parliament backs the Commission’s proposal to clearly 
define extraordinary circumstances (e.g. strikes, storms and operational problems) which 
are outside an airline’s control, so excluding any compensation obligation. However, unlike 
the Commission’s proposal, the Parliament proposes that technical faults can almost never 
be exempt. In addition, Parliament proposes an exhaustive list for exceptional 
circumstances, while the Commission argues for an ‘open’ list to take account of future 
unforeseen circumstances. 
 Liability limit: currently there is no limit to liability placed on airlines, even in extraordinary 
circumstances (e.g. the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption). The Commission proposes liability 
should be limited to three nights, giving airlines some predictability when budgeting for 
passenger rights, however the Parliament proposes a limit of five nights. 
 Bankruptcy: the Parliament proposes to impose an obligation on airlines to take insurance 
in case of bankruptcy (insolvency), ensuring that passengers would be reimbursed the cost 
of their tickets and stranded passengers would be repatriated. However, the Commission is 
concerned that such a systemic measure would double the cost of the current Air Passenger 
Regulation for airlines, and that these costs would then get passed on to passengers 
through increased ticket prices. 
 
Haul 
 Delay duration  
≥ 90 mins ≥ 2 hours ≥ 3 hours ≥ 4 hours ≥ 5 hours ≥ 8 hours 
Short haul © ©  ©   €250 ©   €250 ©     €250  +® 
Medium haul © ©  ©   €400 ©   €400 ©     €400 +® 
Long haul © ©   ©   €300* ©   €600 ©     €600 +® 
  
Key 
  Care (e.g. reasonable meals and refreshments)   
  Reimbursement of ticket     
€ Compensation (refers to arrival delay)      
© Rights re. missed connecting flights     black: 2005 
® Better rights re. re-routing on other airlines   blue: 2009 
 * For delays of three to four hours    red: 2016-17(est.) 
      
 
Figure 3. Current, proposed and planned passenger rights as a function of delay duration 
These effects are captured in Figure 3. The current rules regarding compensation for a missed 
connection are the same as for flight delays11. As the UK CAA details12, passengers may be entitled 
to compensation if they miss a connection. The flight must be either be departing from an EU airport 
(and operated by any airline), or arriving at an EU airport and operated by an EU airline. This applies 
to through tickets only and the airline must be responsible for the cause of the missed connection. 
The right to claim compensation depends on how late the passenger arrives at the final destination. 
Examining the General Conditions of Carriage for British Airways13, it is stated in Clause 9(b)(3) that, 
if the operator causes the passenger to miss a connecting flight on which they hold a confirmed 
reservation, a choice of one of three remedies is available: 
Remedy 1 - We will carry you as soon as we can to the destination shown on your ticket on another of our scheduled services 
on which a seat is available in the class of service for which you have paid the fare. If we do this, we will not charge you extra 
and where necessary, will extend the validity period of your ticket. 
Remedy 2 - We will carry you to the destination shown on your ticket in the class of service for which you have paid the fare at 
a later date at your convenience and within the validity period of your ticket on another of our scheduled services on which a 
seat is available. If we do this, we will not charge you extra. 
                                                     
11 See CJEU (2013) ruling on Regulation 261. 
12 http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=2211&pagetype=90&pageid=15462 
13 http://www.britishairways.com/en-gb/information/legal/british-airways/general-conditions-of-carriage 
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Remedy 3 - We will give or obtain for you an involuntary fare refund. We will give you additional assistance, such as 
compensation, refreshments and other care and reimbursement, if required to do so by any law which may apply. We will have 
no further liability to you. 
The General Conditions of Carriage for Lufthansa14, in Clause 10.2 on involuntary refunds, states 
that: 
If we cancel a flight, fail to operate a flight reasonably according to schedule, fail to stop at your destination or Stopover, or 
cause you to miss a connecting flight which you hold a reservation, the amount of the refund shall be: 
10.2.1.1. if no portion of the Ticket has been used, an amount equal to the fare paid, 
10.2.1.2. if a portion of the Ticket has been used, the refund will be not less than the difference between the fare paid and the 
applicable fare for travel between the points for which the Ticket has been used. 
The General Conditions of Carriage for KLM15, on the other hand, do not explicitly mention missed 
connections, although the website search result for “missed connection” states that: “If you miss your 
connecting flight, we will automatically rebook you to the next available flight.” Thus, no compensation 
or care per se is formally offered. Whilst airlines generally provide rerouting and assistance in cases 
of missed connections, this remains airline-dependent and is not universal (European Commission, 
2013c). 
The potential revision to Regulation 261 regarding the obligations for connecting flights would 
represent a new requirement on airlines. The revision process, overall, remains far from complete. 
The European Parliament will negotiate with the European Council (EU member states), after the 
latter has reached agreement on a common position; meanwhile industry views are amongst those 
being taken into consideration and adoption of the revised Regulation is expected in 2015 at the 
earliest, with the rules becoming law by 2016-17 (European Regions Airline Association, 2014). 
1.2.6 Regulation 261 – passenger awareness 
This section reports on passenger awareness of Regulation 261. Increased awareness is likely to 
drive up claim rates to airlines and thus increase the cost of a given disruption. Although evidence is 
mixed, it generally points to increasing awareness. In parallel, studies regarding the enforcement of 
the Regulation have shown gradual but slow improvements over time, although many member states 
still do not enforce the Regulation effectively and some are therefore deemed unlikely to do so in 
future, either (European Commission, 2013c). National Civil Aviation Authorities and the European 
Parliament have taken action to raise awareness of the Regulation. An example of this is the 
directions against Ryanair and Aer Lingus issued by the Irish Commission for Aviation Regulation in 
2008 to ensure the display of the Regulation at check-in (Commission for Aviation Regulation, 2009). 
Passenger awareness and claim rates are also increased both through the Commission’s passenger 
rights app16 and commercial sites17 helping passengers to make claims. Potentially, in some member 
states, provisions allowing collective action to claim compensation on the part of a group of 
passengers may be introduced (European Commission, 2013c). 




17 To cite a few examples: http://www.getairhelp.com/gb; https://www.refund.me/en/; https://www.reclamador.es/en 
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Figure 4. Complaints per million passengers reported to the UK CAA 
The eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull in 2010 resulted in over 100 000 flight 
cancellations and affected more than 10 million passengers (EUROCONTROL, 2010). This disruption 
is illustrated in Figure 4. The number of complaints in the United Kingdom increased significantly due 
to the high amount of delays and cancellations; the Commission for Aviation Regulation of Ireland 
received in 2010 more than double the number of complaints than the previous year (Commission for 
Aviation Regulation, 2011). This major disruption also helped in the dissemination of passenger rights 
information and it might be one of the reasons for the higher number of complaints in the following 
year (2011 and beginning of 2012) with respect to the pre-eruption period (2007-2009). No worsening 
of the aggregate system performance that could otherwise justify this increment in complaints has 
been found (e.g. the average en-route ATFM delay per flight has been constant or even decreased in 
recent years (2011-2013 period) (EUROCONTROL, 2014). 
Table 1. Complaints received by European NEBs, 2010- 2012 
Year Total complaints Re. long* delays Re. cancellations Re. denied boarding 
2010 91 726 16 334 50 461 3 140 
2011 52 675 18 893 18 160 3 751 
2012 56 478 21 710 21 330 3 757 
* Of at least 2 hours, as defined to be in scope by the Regulation. 
Table 1 shows the total number of complaints and the distribution thereof with regard to the 
Regulation (European Commission, 2014b) received by European National Enforcement Bodies 
(NEBs). Wider trends regarding total complaints are shown in Figure 5, and the distributions are 
plotted in more detail in Figure 6. Specific overall trends are difficult to identify, as so many factors 
affect the number of complaints received, including specific national events (such as the bankruptcy 
of a major airline, strikes, or changes in NEB reporting) and international events. Clearly, a major 
factor in 2010 was the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, although the exact number of complaints specifically 
associated with this is unknown. 2010 also saw numerous industrial actions and severe weather 
conditions. Notwithstanding the exceptional events of 2010, two observations are clear from Table 1: 
complaints regarding delays show a clear upward trend and those regarding denied boarding are 
relatively flat. 
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Figure 5. Total number of complaints received by European NEBs, 2007-2012 
Source: European Commission (2014b). 
At a high level, Figure 7 shows that: (a) all types of long delay frequencies fell from 2010, in 2011 and 
2012; (b) long delay frequencies were relatively stable from 2011 to 2012. European traffic across this 
period was relatively stable between 2010 (9.49 million flights) and 2012 (9.55 million flights), with a 
modest increase in 2011 (9.78 million flights), still below 2008 levels (10.1 million flights) when the 
economic crisis started (EUROCONTROL: 2011, 2012, 2013). Although these figures are fairly crude 
they nevertheless underline an increase in delay complaints set in a context of improving or stable 




Figure 6. Distribution between grounds for lodging complaints, 2010-2012 
Source: European Commission (2014b). 
 
 
Figure 7. Crude distribution of flight delays by duration, 2007-2012 
Source: European Commission (2014b). 
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Regarding direct survey evidence on passenger awareness, in a report commissioned by the 
European Commission (2014c) reporting on fieldwork undertaken in September 2014 across the 28 
member states with some 28 050 respondents, respondents were evenly divided regarding air 
passenger rights: 37%18 agreed that passengers were well informed by airlines about their rights, 
whereas an equal percentage disagreed. It is also reported (ibid.) that in the 2009 Special 
Eurobarometer on air passengers’ rights, a similar question was asked. Although it is not possible to 
make rigorously direct comparisons due to changes in the question structures, the results in 2014 
were pretty similar to those in 2009, i.e. no overall substantial increase in awareness was apparent. 
There was wide variation between the member states, however. 
Surveys carried out in Germany, Denmark and the UK show that 75% of surveyed passengers facing 
problems for delays or cancellations were offered re-routing, but that care was offered in less than 
50% of cases (European Commission, 2013b). It is further stated that the German survey showed that 
where passengers did complain, over 20% of them did not receive a response from the airline. 
The European Commission (2013c) reports that data from airlines indicate that 5-10% of passengers 
entitled to compensation (in cases of cancellation or long delay) actually claim it. The Commission 
(ibid.) assumes that the claim rate will slowly increase over time, as a function of factors indentifed 
above. The total cost to airlines is predicted to increases slowly as a share of airline revenue, from 
0.6% (over 2007-2009), to 0.7% in 2025. In assessing policy options, both ‘low’ (current, adopted 
claim rate of 10% for 2012, assumed to increase by 0.5% each year) and (theoretical) ‘maximum’ (all 
entitled passengers claiming) compensation claim rate impacts are explored (ibid.). A survey of 500 
UK air travellers conducted on behalf of IRN Research during October 2014 (IRN Research, 2014) 
found that around 40% of air passengers with grounds to claim showed a reluctance to do so. It was 
concluded, however, that current trends suggest a moderate increase in claims in 2014, albeit with a 
“much higher rate of conversion. As the awareness grows that the claims process is easier this will 
stimulate more direct claims to airlines […]” (ibid.). These limited quantitative data will be taken 
forward in our delay hard cost models presented in Section 3. 
 
                                                     
18 Averages are weighted by member state populations.  
The cost of passenger delay to airlines in Europe Edition 2   
Consultation document 
15 of 38 
 
© University of Westminster, 2015. Reprint with approval of publisher and the source properly acknowledged. 
2 Wider market considerations and soft passenger costs 
2.1 Previous calculations on the soft cost of delay 
In general, passengers’ and airlines’ interests are relatively well aligned where airlines are operating 
in a well-functioning competitive market; if airlines do not offer prices and services attractive to 
customers they will lose market share. However, as airlines try to maximise their profits at the 
expense of passengers’ convenience, in some cases, such as when airlines have market power, 
there might be a misalignment of interest (Cambridge Economic Policy Associates, 2010). This may 
apply to disruptions, i.e. delays, cancellations, diversions and reschedulings. 
The passenger soft cost of delay is often a dominant component in the economics of airline 
unpunctuality. Nevertheless, it remains poorly understood, with almost no quantitative costs 
published. Soft costs can only be properly understood through market research. The relationship 
between airline unpunctuality and passenger tolerance, airline market share and corporate 
performance, has been discussed in our previous reporting adopted by EUROCONTROL (Cook and 
Tanner, 2011).  
 
For distributing the soft costs of delay, a logit function was used to describe passenger dissatisfaction 
against various levels of delay. This curve is used to distribute the soft cost as a function of delay 
duration, and may be thought of as a proxy for the propensity of a passenger to switch from a given 





Figure 8. Passenger dissatisfaction as a function of delay duration 
 
This is plotted in Figure 8 (black curve) and has the desirable characteristics of maintaining a low 
value for some time, then rapidly increasing through a zone of ‘intolerance’, before levelling off. 
Quantification of the saturation of delay inconvenience and crossovers in Kano customer satisfaction 
‘requirements’ contributed towards the model. Relationships between market share, punctuality and 
customer satisfaction were also examined (ibid.). 
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Since soft costs refer to a loss in revenue to one airline as a result of a delay on one occasion, this 
loss may be considered to be largely the gain of another airline, gaining a passenger who has 
transferred their custom. When scalable costs (multiplied over a period of time or a network) are 
assessed, only some net loss to the airlines of the soft costs is likely (e.g. due to trip mode 
substitution, trip consolidation, trip replacement (e.g. teleconference) or cancellation). This is 
accounted for by using a reducing scalar (ibid.) We next examine whether there is any evidence of 
fundamental changes to the assumptions made in these previous calculations. 
 
2.2 Passenger satisfaction and market share  
It is generally challenging to identify clear links between passenger satisfaction and bottom-line 
impact, particularly in a market which is increasingly price-dominated, which is especially true on 
short-haul routes and with LCC penetration (Pearson and Merkert, 2013). Airlines with high customer 
satisfaction may achieve poor margins and vice versa (ibid.). Furthermore, in Europe, there is some 
degree of blurring between previously distinct airline business models. Differences between full-
service airlines and LCCs is changing, as the former are adopting aspects of the latter, such as 
separate charges for seat choice, baggage or meals. Some charter airlines also operate a mixture of 
the two models, and sell seats as part of package holidays and on a seat-only basis (Cambridge 
Economic Policy Associates, 2010). 
 
However, passengers not only consider fare levels when purchasing their ticket, but also other factors 
such as quality of service (as an example of a relatively recent discussion, see Yang et al. (2012)). 
Expectations of service quality are a significant predictor of complaint rates, and passengers are more 
likely to complain if actual service quality falls below their expectations (Forbes, 2008a). Dresner and 
Xu (1995) found that three measures of customer service (mishandled baggage, ticket over-sales and 
on-time performance) were all positively related to customer complaints. A significant correlation 
between complaints and actual service quality was detected in an analysis of Air Travel Consumer 
Report19 data in the period 1988 and 2000 (Forbes, 2008a). A similar analysis by Steven et al. (2012) 
confirmed this relationship. As shown in Figure 9, the number of complaints tends to decrease as the 
percentage of on-time flights increases, whereas Figure 10 presents a linear relationship between 
cancellation and complaints. Steven et al. (ibid.) also found that this nonlinear relationship between 
customer service variables and customer satisfaction can be used to estimate the optimal levels of 
customer service that can be provided by airlines to maximise profitability. 
 
 
Figure 9. Relationship between on-time performance and complaints 
Source: Steven et al. (2012). 
                                                     
19 A monthly report generated by the US Department of Transport. Flight delays, mishandled baggage and oversales analysis 
are based on data collected by the Department's Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Consumer complaints are compiled by the 
Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings' Aviation Consumer Protection Division and the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Transportation Security Administration. 
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Figure 10. Linear relationship between flight cancellations and complaints 
Source: Steven et al. (2012). 
Also using Air Travel Consumer Report data and data from the Bureau of Transport Statistics to 
perform a regression analysis, Wittman (2014) shows that a one per cent increase in ‘on-time’ 
performance is associated with a reduction in the flight problem complaint rate of 0.028 complaints 
per 100 000 passengers, controlling for time and airline fixed-effects. (Based on the data sources, this 
is presumably counting flights on-time if operated less than 15 minutes after the scheduled time.) 
 
The expectation of LCC passengers regarding quality of service may be lower because they pay less 
for their tickets. Passengers selecting LCCs primarily consider the fare, whilst passengers select full-
service carriers partially for the additional product services they provide (O’Connell and Williams, 
2005). It has been shown by Bhadra (2009) that air travellers may trade-off rights to complain in 
return for lower fares, even when faced with the same or higher levels of delays. 
According to Lubbe and Victor (2012), only 24.3% of the corporate population could be considered 
frequent travellers, but they represent 63.5% of the substantial flight delays experienced; these 
frequent flyers are usually passengers flying on business. Different types of airline will experience 
different consequential impacts: travellers who assign a higher value to quality of service will be more 
willing to defect if the service falls below expectation (i.e. generating higher soft costs), even if this 
effect can be compensated for to some extent such as through frequent flyer program (FFP) benefits. 
However, in recent years more business travellers are using the services of low-cost carriers. A recent 
survey shows that almost 29% of Ryanair passengers were travelling on business (Cambridge 
Economic Policy Associates, 2010). Passengers selecting full-service carriers present a range of 
reasons for selecting such airlines (service reliability, quality, schedules, frequent flyer programs, 
etc.), whilst more than 75% of respondents stated that fare level was the main reason to select a LCC 
(O’Connell and Williams, 2005). LCC passengers are often far more sensitive to price than service 
(see, for example, a Chinese study (Chiou and Chen, 2010), based on 968 valid questionnaires 
disseminated in March 2007 to passengers flying Spring Airlines, the first LCC in China). 
In some markets, airlines may try to compensate for the effect of market loss, due to passenger 
dissatisfaction, with economic tactics. Thus, prices may fall as flight delays increase, particularly in 
competitive markets. According to a study by Forbes (2008b), prices fall by USD 1.42 on average for 
direct passengers and by USD 0.77 on average for connecting passengers for each additional minute 
of delay. On competitive routes, the reduction can be up to USD 2.44 per minute of delay for direct 
passengers. This is strategic cost effect, rather than a tactical impact, however. 
Ferrer et al. (2012) analysed 29 months of a major international airline’s operations, including data 
from 348 468 passengers. The sample was partitioned into ten sub-periods, nine of three months long 
and the tenth of two months, and segmented chronologically as periods 1 to 10. The passengers who 
experienced delay greater than 60 minutes in the third period of the sample, but no delay in the rest of 
the data, were selected. Those passengers were grouped and compared with similar passengers who 
may or may not have experienced delay. The results show that delays have a negative impact on 
passenger behaviour (ibid.): 
 passengers who experienced delays during the third period flew less than passengers in the 
control group (see Table 2); 
 multiple delays have a more negative impact than a single delay (see Table 2); 
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 the marginal effect of additional delay is negative and convex (results show that the first delay 
has a greater impact on non-members of the FFP and a similar effect on FFP members with 
respect to the second); 
 the negative effect of delays persists during the entire period studied; 
 the negative financial effects of flight delays are stronger for members than for non-members, 
even though the relative effect of delays on the number of flights is the same for both groups. 
 
Table 2. Trip reduction by passenger delay experience and FFP membership 
FFP members Non-members 
1 delay 2 delays 1 delay 2 delays 
-0.58 -1.14 -0.17 -0.24 
Source: Ferrer et al. (2012). 
 
 
2.3 Reporting delay costs by delay duration and caps applied 
The methodology previously deployed for EUROCONTROL (Cook and Tanner, 2011) reported delay 
cost values for various increments of delay duration (see Table 3, for example), up to a maximum of 
300 minutes (5 hours). In theory, values could be reported for far higher delay durations, but it has 
been previously established that at higher delay: 
(a) the costs per minute start to saturate; 
(b) it often becomes more cost effective for the airline to cancel (or consolidate) flights; 
(c) these levels of delay become very rare. 
(a) Indications of the saturation of soft costs may be seen in Figure 8. Similar effects for hard costs (at 
higher delay durations) will be presented in Section 3.2. 
(b) When allocating limits to how much reactionary delay could be realistically assigned to higher 
duration primary delays, caps of four hours (240 minutes) and five hours (300 minutes) have been 
previously assigned20 to the narrowbody and widebody cases, respectively. Moreover, these cost 
thresholds have also been found to be in fairly reasonable agreement (ibid.) with narrowbody and 
widebody average cancellation costs (within 8% and 42%, respectively), as reported in 
EUROCONTROL’s ‘Standard Inputs’ (EUROCONTROL, 2009)21. 
(c) Regarding the relative infrequency of delays greater than 300 minutes, EUROCONTROL reporting 
of ATFM and ACARS delays is truncated at this threshold. In 2014, delay durations greater than 300 
minutes represented 0.001% and 0.1% of delays in these two categories, respectively22. See also 
Figure 12. 
For these reasons, it is proposed to report delay costs up to and including durations of 300 minutes 
and to treat this duration as an effective threshold, or cap, in most reporting contexts. 
 
 
                                                     
20 Simple models suggest that total reactionary delays of much more than four hours are difficult to allocate to typical 
narrowbody operational days, without making a significant change, such as cancelling one or more rotations. Reactionary costs 
have thus been capped in such models at the cost of four hours of total rotational minutes under any given scenario. Compared 
to the narrowbody case, with fewer rotations over which to distribute delay but longer layovers in which to potentially reduce 
them, a cost cap of five hours has been judgementally assigned to widebody cases. Reactionary costs are not dealt with in this 
report, however – see Cook and Tanner (2011) for details. 
21 These values are based on 2006 estimates with inflationary adjustments, and still form the basis of the most recent 
EUROCONTROL (2013) values, such that a new analysis is not performed here. 
22 Personal communication, EUROCONTROL (2015). 
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2.4 Updated soft cost of delay 
 
Returning to the specifics of the soft cost calculations, we conclude that there is no substantive 
evidence to change the assumptions made in previous soft cost of delay calculations. Arguably, 
increasing passenger information and awareness of Regulation 261 rights (inter alia) could drive up 
sensitivities to performance, and hence soft costs. On the other hand, claim rates remain low, and 
airline competition high. Ideally, as flagged in Section 4.2, a substantive and dedicated research effort 
would be used to further quantify these costs and the parameters driving them. Until such time, we 
monitor the literature for new empirical insights and continue to use the methodology previously 
deployed (ibid.), using a simple inflationary increase (see Annex 2) on the 2010 costs (same fit as 
Figure 8) with the updated seat, load factor and passenger allocations described in Annex 3, to yield 
the 2014 values in Table 3 (shown to the nearest 10 Euros, except the first two columns). (As detailed 
in the previous section, these are reported up to 300 minutes; although the per-minute cost values 
saturate at lower delay durations, the absolute costs continue to increase, of course.) 
 
Table 3. Soft costs by delay duration and aircraft type (base cost scenario) 
Delay 
(mins) 
5 15 30 60 90 120 180 240 300 
B733 1 16 90 480 950 1 340 2 030 2 710 3 380 
B734 2 18 100 550 1 080 1 520 2 310 3 090 3 860 
B735 1 14 80 430 840 1 190 1 800 2 400 3 000 
B738 2 20 110 620 1 220 1 710 2 600 3 470 4 330 
B752 2 24 140 750 1 480 2 090 3 170 4 220 5 280 
B763 3 30 170 940 1 840 2 590 3 920 5 240 6 540 
B744 4 49 280 1 510 2 970 4 170 6 330 8 450 10 560 
A319 1 16 90 510 1 000 1 410 2 140 2 860 3 570 
A320 2 19 110 590 1 150 1 620 2 460 3 290 4 110 
A321 2 23 130 710 1 400 1 970 3 000 4 000 5 000 
AT43 0 5 30 160 320 450 680 910 1 140 
AT72 1 8 40 230 460 650 990 1 320 1 640 
DH8D 1 8 50 260 510 710 1 080 1 440 1 800 
E190 1 11 60 350 680 960 1 460 1 950 2 430 
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3 Hard costs of passenger delay 
3.1 Deriving hard costs from Regulation 261 principles 
The objective of this section is to review the costing of the hard cost of delay, by delay duration, 
drawing on the earlier discussion of Regulation 261 – since this significantly drives the airline hard 
costs of passenger delay. We explore the question: is there evidence to substantially adjust 
previously adopted values? 
 
Table 4. Delay duration by current Regulation 261 estimated costs 
Haul 
Delay duration  
≥ 2 hours ≥ 3 hours ≥ 4 hours ≥ 5 hours ≥ 10hours ≥8 
Short haul    €250   €250     €250  (accommodation) 
Medium haul    €400   €400     €400 (accommodation) 
Long haul        €300   €600     €600 (accommodation) 
  
Key 
  Care (e.g. reasonable meals and refreshments)   
  Reimbursement of ticket     
€ Compensation (refers to arrival delay) 
 
 
Table 4 reproduces the data captured earlier in Figure 2, further indicating the potential requirement 
of providing accommodation for passengers who cannot be rebooked/conveyed to their destination or 
returned to their origin during the operational day. In Table 5 and Table 6 these are fully converted 
into departure delay costs, making a number of assumptions. The former table assumes that the 
passengers associated with these costs wait for an onward flight (be that the delayed flight or as a 
rebooking). The latter table assumes the associated passengers abandon their trip and are refunded. 
To produce an overall cost estimate (by combining the tables), estimates of the ratios of these 
passenger types need to be made. 
 
Table 5. Departure delay duration base scenario estimated costs – 80% of pax wait for flight 
Haul 
Departure delay duration  
≥ 2 hours ≥ 3 hours ≥ 4 hours ≥ 5 hours ≥ 10 hours ≥8 
Short haul €680% €680%  €25011% €680%  €25011%   €26510% €1580% €25011%    €26550% €21 €25011% €65 
Medium haul  €680%  €40011% €680%  €40011%   €34510% €1580% €40011%   €34550% €21 €40011% €65 
Long haul           €30011% €680%   €60011% €117010% €1580% €60011% €117050% €21 €60011% €65 




Table 6. Departure delay duration base scenario estimated costs – 20% pax opt for refund 
 
Haul 
Departure delay duration  
≥ 2 hours ≥ 3 hours ≥ 4 hours ≥ 5 hours ≥ 10 hours ≥8 
Short haul €680% €680%  €25011% €680%  €25011%   €26590% €1580% €25011%    €26590% €21 €25011% €65 
Medium haul  €680%  €40011% €680%  €40011%   €34590% €1580% €40011%   €34590% €21 €40011% €65 
Long haul           €30011% €680%  €60011% €117090% €1580% €60011% €117090% €21 €60011% €65 
 Key: Care, reimbursement, compensation, accommodation  
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Regulation 261 allows for a reimbursement to be made when the delay is at least five hours, 
according to Article 8(1)(a)23. It is assumed in our calculations that there is no delay recovery (or 
worsening) across the thresholds, e.g. a 4.5-hour departure delay does not result in an arrival delay of 
less than 4 hours or more than 5 hours. This is not always entirely authentic, especially during more 
complicated situations relating to passenger itineraries involving connecting flights and for passengers 
who return to their origin and accept a refund. However, it allows us, at this aggregate level, to assign 
reasonable delay costs by departure delay duration, which is the objective of the calculations. 
 
In 2012, a study was finalised by Steer Davies Gleave (SDG) in support of a Commission Impact 
Assessment (European Commission, 2013c), which studied the prevalent market situation, 
quantitatively assessing the impacts of numerous policy measures. In this section, we use several of 
these cost estimates, based on assumptions and calculations made by SDG. We will attempt to map 
these values to a cost of delay: (i) by delay duration, and; (ii) producing low, base and high cost 
scenario estimates, to compare them with the previously reported values adopted by 
EUROCONTROL. The objective of the SDG calulation was, however, focused on calculating total, 
network costs. The mapping of SDG costs into the framework required here has necessitated further 
simplifications and assumptions in some respects, although some additional complexity is introduced 
in other respects. 
 
The superscript values in the tables indicate the assumed uptake (or claim rate) of the various costs. 
These are explained on a category-by-category basis. Where absent, a 100% value is assumed, or 
the rate is already included in the estimate. The Euro cost shown is without the discount. These vary 
across the low, base and high cost scenarios. The base scenario is considered first. 
 
Article 9 (a) of Regulation 261 stipulates the provision of meals and refreshments “in a reasonable 
relation to the waiting time”. As per the SDG assumptions, it is assumed that a refreshment is offered 
at the first stipulated threshold, and every five hours thereafter. Meals are offered after five hours of 
delay, and every subsequent five hours. To simplify the calculations somewhat, we have used an 
upper band of ≥10 hours of delay. In this band, a further refreshment and meal is assumed. These 
costs are based on 2012 airport averages calculated by SDG, inflated to 2014 prices according to the 
inflation values of Appendix 2, and rounded to the nearest whole Euro. It assumed that uptake rates 
are 80% for the base scenario, whereas 20% of passengers either do not claim (or are not offered) 
the care (some of whom may be in invited lounges, with such provision available). At the highest 
delay threshold, it is assumed that the entitlement is taken up by all passengers.   
 
The SDG assumption is that hotel accommodation is triggered at 12 hours. As a small departure from 
this, our assumption is that this is triggered by 10 hours of departure delay on average. This is partly 
to simplify the tables. (It is expected that further in-house simulation modelling will allow us to quantify 
this statistically more accurately in future.) A single room is assumed to be required for business 
purpose trips and a room to be shared for leisure purpose trips. It is assumed to be not required at all 
for passengers visiting friends and relatives and at the destination of the original journey. Connecting 
passengers and those stranded at their destination are assumed to require accommodation, whereas 
50% at their origin are assumed to return home. Based on these assumptions, and journey purpose 
by carrier type cross-tabulations, statistical (probabilistic) accommodation charges were derived, to 
which we have added the same, common average local transport cost, and inflated the values as 
previously described to 2014 values, yielding: regional (EUR 65), ‘traditional scheduled’ (EUR 72), 
LCC (EUR 53), charter (EUR 47). The unweighted average of these values and the mean of the 
highest and lowest values, both gives EUR 60. The room sharing and non-requirement rates applied 
judgmentally may be a little conservative, however, such that we adopt the ‘regional’ value as our 
base scenario cost at EUR 65. (To be used in later tabulations, we also round the upper estimate to 
EUR 75 for the high cost scenario and the lower estimate to EUR 50 for the low cost scenario.) Since 
these values are already probabilistic, no percentage take-up rate is associated with them. We 
assume these costs apply to all passenger waits above 10 hours (whether for an onward flight, or 
                                                     
23 Reimbursement […] of the full cost of the ticket at the price at which it was bought, for the part or parts of the journey not 
made, and for the part or parts already made if the flight is no longer serving any purpose in relation to the passenger's original 
travel plan, together with, when relevant […] a return flight to the first point of departure, at the earliest opportunity. 
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associated with a refund and return to origin: although this latter situation would less often put the 
passenger in a situation experiencing over 10 hours of delay, the associated accommodation and 
care costs would be triggered in such eventualities). 
 
In contrast, we do not include the EUR 3.38 average communication cost. This SDG value is mostly 
derived from an assumption of just over EUR 5 for 50% of passengers wishing to send an e-mail. 
Instead, we take the view that most passengers would either internalise this cost, use (free) wifi or not 
require to notify anybody regarding their disruption. Reducing roaming charges for phone calls within 
the EU are likely to contribute to this effect. A Danish survey (ibid.) cited only 2% of delayed 
passengers being offered such communications, although diverse assumptions are possible here. 
Regarding baggage delay, our assumptions concur with the airline interviews (ibid.) reporting that 
compensation for delayed baggage is rarely paid under the Montreal Convention. 
 
The cost of ticket reimbursements have been calculated by SDG as assumed to be the cost of the 
ticket purchased by the passenger, computed using airline financial data and combining the yield per 
passenger kilometre and the average distance, to produce average ticket prices for each route length 
and carrier type. Adopting a different approach, and based on previous in-house modelling (SESAR, 
2013) using 2.9 million passenger itineraries for September 2010, we have modelled the likely 
reimbursements due to flight delays, assuming that delays of over 5 hours on early legs would trigger 
full ticket refunds. These values are inflated to 2014 values (as per Annex 2), and shown in Table 7. 
These are averaged across all fare types (i.e. including higher class fares) and assess costs for full 
itineraries (whereas the SDG calculations do not explicitly include connections). The values shown 
are thus rather higher than the SDG values. In our base cost scenario, 80% of passengers are 
assumed to wait for the delayed flight or accept a rebooking at delays of 5 hours or more, whilst 20% 
opt for reimbursement, and these ratios are delpoyed to produce the aggregate costs required, i.e. to 
combine Table 5 and Table 6. (The SDG ratios of 90%:10% are used in our low cost scenario – see 
Annex 4.) 
 
Table 7. Average per passenger total reimbursements due by length of haul 
Length of haul Average total reimbursement due (EUR) 
Short haul 265 
Medium haul 345 
Long haul 1170 
 
For rebooking, we assume that most passengers are rebooked on the same carrier or using a within-
alliance reciprocal agreement, for delays of less than 10 hours, with only 10% of passengers thus 
generating a rebooking fee for the carrier (i.e. 10% of the reimbursement values of Table 7 are 
applied as a cost). For delay durations greater than this, across all lengths of haul, in the base cost 
scenario it is assumed that after such high durations (and with an overnight assumed), 50% of 
passengers are booked on the same carrier, such that only half the reimbursement value is applied as 
a cost to the airline. (These fares are transferred through IATA proration rules.) Where the fares are 
reimbursed to the passenger (Table 6), we assume that the fares of Table 7 are repaid, but that the 
airlines recover some of the taxes. Taxes, fees and carrier charges vary very greatly as a percentage 
of the ticket price. Whilst they are typically fixed on a given route, they will usually comprise a much 
lower percentage of bookings made close to the travel date, since the airline fare is usually much 
higher. It is difficult to establish clear patterns by length of haul, although they may comprise 75% or 
more of the total ticket price on long-haul routes. Across all haul types, notwithstanding the substantial 
variability, we have assumed 20% as an approximate average value, and that one half of this (10%) is 
not consumed, and thus recoverable (e.g. from the destination airport). The 20% may also hold for 
LCC flights (whereby the airport charges are lower, but so are the fares), although these may even be 
below 5% on some routes. For LCCs, reciprocal agreements are less common and it is likely that 
rebooking onto another carrier would cost more than a fare reimbursement. We have assumed that 
this would be off-set by LCCs more persistently pursuing rebookings on their own flights and, unlike 
the SDG report, we have neither reflected higher rebooking costs for LCCs nor assumed 50% of 
passengers are rerouted on other carriers. Finally, compensation is assumed to be claimed by 10% of 
passengers in the SDG report, with an increase of 0.5 percentage points per year, rendering a value 
of 11%  for 2014, which has been adopted as the baseline value here. 
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3.2 Updated hard cost of delay 
 
In this section, we consider the extent to which the costs computed in the previous section can be 
compared with those of previous reporting adopted by EUROCONTROL (Cook and Tanner, 2011), 
and conclude with proposals for the 2014 values. 
 
Evaluating the cells in Table 5 and Table 6 (multiplying the costs by the percentage ‘rates’) and 
combining these tables (80:20%, as explained) yields the costs of Table 8. The minimum time 
thresholds for Regulation 261 entitlements are shown in the column headings. Plotted as a cost per 
minute, the relative saturation of these costs is observed in Figure 11, further reflecting the discussion 
of Section 2.3. 
 












Short haul 5 32 32 108 267 
Medium haul 0 49 49 146 330 





Figure 11. Hard cost per-minute saturation effects at higher delays 
 
It will be noted that these costs are highly ‘stepped’, with very low or zero costs assigned even at two 
hours of delay. Airline-reported experience suggests that this is not the case in practice and that even 
small delays are (statistically) likely to produce small costs. For example, even a 15 or 30 minute 
delay could cause a passenger to miss a connection. We therefore ‘smoothed’24 the delays shown in 
Table 8 across the full range of delay values used in Table 3. Next, using the seat, load factor and 
passenger allocations described in Annex 3, and 2010 distributions of aircraft movements by length of 
haul25, we produced raw delay cost values for each aircraft for each delay duration26. Table 9 
compares these new assessment costs for 5, 15 and 300 minutes of delay, with those produced for 
2010 (not inflated to 2014 values) in the previous reporting adopted by EUROCONTROL (ibid.) 
(Values for 2010 for the DH8D, E190 and A332 have been calculated retrospectively, using the 
previous methodology, for comparative purposes, since these aircraft were not included in the original 
set of aircraft evaluated.) 
 
                                                     
24 Quadratic, least-squares, through-origin fits are used. Correlation coefficients (r2) range from 0.93 to 0.97 across the 15 
aircraft, with an average value of 0.96. Such fits, as opposed to linear fits, have been historically useful.  
25 Data not shown to avoid clutter. 
26 Data not shown to avoid clutter. 
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Table 9. Matching assessment hard costs with previous reporting (base cost scenario) 
Delay (mins) 5 15 300 
B733 156% 71% 20% 
B734 170% 77% 20% 
B735 152% 69% 19% 
B738 176% 79% 21% 
B752 220% 101% 32% 
B763 207% 100% 44% 
B744 205% 102% 52% 
A319 154% 70% 20% 
A320 166% 75% 20% 
A321 177% 80% 21% 
AT43 130% 59% 18% 
AT72 131% 60% 18% 
DH8D 131% (60%) (18%) 
E190 138% (63%) (19%) 
A332 206% (100%) (46%) 
Average match 168% 78% 26% 
 
We note that the new assessment values for 15 minutes of delay are often very similar to the previous 
values, although at 5 minutes they are considerably higher. It is also to be noted that this is in the 
region of peak delay distribution, i.e. where most delays are encountered, as shown in Figure 12 
(positive delay values only included, ACARS delays include all delay types reported by airlines, albeit 
with incomplete European coverage27). However, since Table 8 has very low or zero cost values even 






Figure 12. Delay duration by delay frequency (2014) 
 
                                                     
27 Data provided through personal communication, EUROCONTROL (2015). 
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The main difference between the Commission Impact Assessment approach and the previous 
method, is the use of more explicit Regulation 261 data in the former. Despite an increase in almost 
all passenger numbers per flight28, the new assessment costs at higher delay durations are 
considerably lower than the previous estimates. Since the cost values at 300 minutes are effectively 
used as cost caps in the EUROCONTROL-adopted model (see Section 2.3), it is particularly 
important that these values are robust. Before moving forward to the final values proposed for 2014, 
we thus consider further the discrepancies in Table 9 at higher values of delay.  
 
Table 10 compares key features of the two approaches. Primarily, we note again that the Commission 
Impact Assessment was not focused on trying to allocate delay values by aircraft type and delay 
duration, which was the focus of the EUROCONTROL-adopted report. Attempts to map from the 
former to the latter have involved a number of assumptions, as detailed above. Nevertheless, the 
agreement at lower delay is broadly good. What factors might contribute to the discrepancy at higher 
delay? Whilst the previous (EUROCONTROL-adopted) method attempted to furnish passenger delay 
costs beyond the scope of Regulation 261 (e.g. airline hard passenger costs incurred beyond the 
duties imposed by the Regulation alone), the Commission Impact Assessment presents a much fuller 
assessment of the Regulation’s cost impacts per se, and these are core drivers of the airline impact. 
(Note that the lack of alignment at higher delay values is not attributable to reactionary delay 
differences, as the values shown relate to primary delay only.) 
 
 
Table 10. Comparison of methods 
Factor 
EUROCONTROL 
(Cook and Tanner, 2011) 
Commission Impact Assessment 
(European Commission, 2013c) 
Year of publication 2011 2013 
Year of (initial) calculations  2010 (2003) 2012 
Airline inputs Two baseline studies; multiple feedback Multiple (indirectly on costs) 
Methodological focus By aircraft type and delay duration  Network impacts; type of haul 
Regulation 261 focus Wider than Regulation 261  Main objective of study 
Regulation 261 cost sources Reported by airlines Independently calculated 
Regulation 261 cost details Medium High 
 
 
Due to the fact that the Commission Impact Assessment had different objectives and scope, a 
detailed sensitivity analysis of how these results might be rendered to better alignment with the 
previously estimated (EUROCONTROL) values is not warranted. Nevertheless, some useful 
observations may be made regarding this alignment. 
 
The low percentage values in the right-hand column of Table 9 are partly driven by under-estimation 
of the quadratic fit smoothing applied. Using the raw values (for 300 minutes of delay), three of the 
percentage matches (viz. the widebody values) rise to above 70%, i.e. the agreement with the 
previous values improves (although the average match only increases from 26% to around 40%).  
 
With the costs at 300 minutes effectively used as cost caps, it is worth examining the values for 600 
minutes of delay derived from the Commission Impact Assessment (the upper limit explicitly 
considered therein). Whilst the cost per minute does not rapidly increase between 300 and 600 
minutes (see Figure 11), the values at 600 minutes give an average match of around 90% with the 
highest, previously estimated (EUROCONTROL) values (i.e. capped at 300 minutes), with several 
values (for the widebodies and B752) now exceeding these previous values. 
 
Finally, for given care and accommodation costs, and fixed fare reimbursement values (Table 7), the 
costs derived from the Commission Impact Assessment are particularly sensitive to the assumed: 
 
                                                     
28 See Annex 3. 
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 rates of compensation paid; 
 distribution between rebooked and reimbursed passengers; 
 proportions of passengers causing airline rebooking fees to be incurred. 
 
Adjusting the first two of these29, assuming a significantly higher compensation claim rate of 50% of 
passengers, and changing the distribution between rebooked and reimbursed passengers to 50:50, 
generates a new average match of around 95% at 300 minutes, although the widebodies and B752 
are now between 120% (B752) and 200% (B744) of the previously estimated (EUROCONTROL) 
values. (These variations investigated at higher delay do not change the matching at lower delay, 
since, for example, compensation and reimbursements/rebookings do not take effect until delays of at 
least 3 hours.) 
 
In conclusion, we have compared the hard cost of passenger delay to the airline in previous reporting 
adopted by EUROCONTROL (Cook and Tanner, 2011) and newer values derived from a Commission 
Impact Assessment (European Commission, 2013c), the latter using more explicit Regulation 261 
data. The extent to which the two methods can be compared is limited. Nevertheless, fairly broad 
agreement has been demonstrated through a crude sensitivity analysis. Any method, such as the 
Commission Impact Assessment, focusing explicitly on passenger rights that take effect from 120 
minutes, will inevitably yield (very) low cost of delay estimates for smaller delays, although it is known 
that such delays still incur costs for airlines (e.g. due to missed connections). When comparing the 
two methods at higher delay values, estimates derived from the Commission Impact Assessment 
suggest that previous reporting for EUROCONTROL may have produced higher estimates than the 
true costs to airlines. On the other hand, the former has focused exclusively on regulatory impacts, 
whereas multiple airline feedback on the latter over a number of years30 suggests that these 
estimates are substantially robust. Therefore, the same approach is taken as with the soft cost 
adjustments reported in Section 2.4, i.e. using a simple inflationary increase (see Annex 2) on the 
2010 costs, combined with the new passenger allocations of Annex 3, to yield the 2014 values. The 
results are shown in Table 11 (shown to the nearest 10 Euros, except the first two columns). 
 
 
Table 11. Hard costs by delay duration and aircraft type (base cost scenario) 
Delay 
(mins) 
5 15 30 60 90 120 180 240 300 
B733 34 239 820 2 840 5 850 9 770 20 150 33 660 50 130 
B734 38 272 940 3 230 6 670 11 140 22 970 38 380 57 160 
B735 30 212 730 2 520 5 190 8 680 17 890 29 890 44 510 
B738 43 306 1 050 3 630 7 490 12 510 25 800 43 100 64 190 
B752 53 373 1 280 4 430 9 130 15 250 31 440 52 540 78 240 
B763 65 462 1 590 5 490 11 310 18 900 38 980 65 130 96 980 
B744 105 746 2 570 8 850 18 250 30 500 62 890 105 080 156 490 
A319 36 252 870 3 000 6 180 10 320 21 280 35 550 52 940 
A320 41 290 1 000 3 450 7 100 11 870 24 480 40 900 60 910 
A321 50 353 1 220 4 190 8 630 14 430 29 750 49 710 74 030 
AT43 11 80 280 950 1 970 3 290 6 780 11 330 16 870 
AT72 16 116 400 1 380 2 840 4 750 9 790 16 360 24 360 
DH8D 18 127 440 1 510 3 120 5 210 10 730 17 930 26 710 
E190 24 172 590 2 040 4 210 7 030 14 500 24 230 36 080 
A332 73 518 1 780 6 150 12 680 21 190 43 680 72 990 108 700 
Euros (2014). 
 
                                                     
29 These assumptions are also varied in the low and high cost scenarios presented in Annex 4. 
30 Personal communications to the University of Westminster. 
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4 Total cost outcomes and further research 
4.1 Total cost of passenger delay to the airline 
 
Table 12 presents the total costs of passenger delay to the airlines, by delay duration and aircraft 
type, for the base scenario. It is the sum of Table 3 (soft costs) and Table 11 (hard costs), shown to 
the nearest 10 Euros. 
 
 
Table 12. Total cost of passenger delay by delay duration and aircraft type (base cost scenario)  
Delay 
(mins) 
5 15 30 60 90 120 180 240 300 
B733 40 250 910 3 320 6 800 11 110 22 180 36 370 53 520 
B734 40 290 1 040 3 780 7 750 12 670 25 280 41 470 61 020 
B735 30 230 810 2 950 6 040 9 860 19 690 32 290 47 510 
B738 40 330 1 170 4 250 8 700 14 220 28 390 46 570 68 520 
B752 50 400 1 420 5 180 10 610 17 340 34 610 56 770 83 520 
B763 70 490 1 760 6 420 13 150 21 490 42 900 70 360 103 530 
B744 110 790 2 850 10 360 21 220 34 670 69 220 113 530 167 050 
A319 40 270 960 3 510 7 180 11 730 23 420 38 410 56 520 
A320 40 310 1 110 4 030 8 260 13 500 26 940 44 190 65 020 
A321 50 380 1 350 4 900 10 040 16 400 32 750 53 710 79 020 
AT43 10 90 310 1 120 2 290 3 740 7 460 12 240 18 010 
AT72 20 120 440 1 610 3 300 5 400 10 780 17 680 26 010 
DH8D 20 140 490 1 770 3 620 5 920 11 810 19 380 28 510 
E190 30 180 660 2 390 4 890 7 990 15 960 26 170 38 510 




Compared with the previously reported values, i.e. excluding the lower three rows for the new aircraft 
types, all values have increased. The average increase is 20%. Most of this increase has been driven 
by the increasing passenger densities on European flights, as reported in Annex 3. 
 
The corresponding low and high cost scenarios are reported in Annex 5. They are also produced by 
the same simple inflationary increases of the previously adopted EUROCONTROL values using the 
Annex 2 inflation data and the scenario-specific, updated passenger allocation data of Annex 3. 
 
 
4.2 Further research 
 
Further research is required to provide a more robust estimate of passenger costs to the airlines as a 
function of delay duration and aircraft type. We recommend that a systematic review be conducted in 
future, across a range of airlines, which should include a full behavioural assessment through 
passenger market research. Soft cost estimates should include conjoint analyses (stated preference) 
techniques. Until such systematic research is implemented, airline feedback on the values presented 
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Annex 1. CJEU, Joined cases C-402/07 and C-432/07. 
 [Extract from Court of Justice of the European Union ruling; non-source emboldening of text.] 
 
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 19 November 2009. 
 
Christopher Sturgeon, Gabriel Sturgeon and Alana Sturgeon v Condor Flugdienst GmbH (C-402/07) 
and Stefan Böck and Cornelia Lepuschitz v Air France SA (C-432/07). 
 
References for a preliminary ruling: Bundesgerichtshof - Germany and Handelsgericht Wien - Austria. 
Air transport - Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 - Article 2(l) and Articles 5, 6 and 7 - Concept of flight ‘delay’ and 
‘cancellation’ - Right to compensation in the event of delay - Concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’. 
 
Joined cases C-402/07 and C-432/07. 
European Court Reports 2009 I-10923•ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2009:716 
 
 
Summary of the Judgment 
 
1.        Transport – Air transport – Regulation No 261/2004 – Common rules on compensation and 
assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights 
(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 261/2004, Arts 2(l), 5 and 6) 
2.        Transport – Air transport – Regulation No 261/2004 – Common rules on compensation and 
assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights 
(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 261/2004, Arts 5, 6 and 7) 
3.        Transport – Air transport – Regulation No 261/2004 – Compensation and assistance to 
passengers in the event of cancellation of flights 
(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 261/2004, Art. 5(3)) 
 
1.        Articles 2(l), 5 and 6 of Regulation No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation 
and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of 
flights must be interpreted as meaning that a flight which is delayed, irrespective of the duration of the 
delay, even if it is long, cannot be regarded as cancelled where the flight is operated in accordance 
with the air carrier’s original planning. 
 
A flight is delayed for the purposes of Article 6 of that regulation if it is operated in accordance with the 
original planning and its actual departure time is later than the scheduled departure time, whilst, 
according to Article 2(l) of that regulation, flight cancellation is the result of non-operation of a flight 
which was previously planned.  
(see paras 32-33, 39, operative part 1) 
 
2.        Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation 
and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of 
flights must be interpreted as meaning that passengers whose flights are delayed may be treated, 
for the purposes of the application of the right to compensation, as passengers whose flights are 
cancelled and they may thus rely on the right to compensation laid down in Article 7 of the regulation 
when they suffer, on account of a flight delay, a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours, that 
is, where they reach their final destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally 
scheduled by the air carrier. Such a delay does not, however, entitle passengers to compensation if 
the air carrier can prove that the long delay was caused by extraordinary circumstances which could 
not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken, namely circumstances 
beyond the actual control of the air carrier.  
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3.        Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and 
assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights 
must be interpreted as meaning that a technical problem in an aircraft which leads to the 
cancellation or delay of a flight is not covered by the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ 
within the meaning of that provision, unless that problem stems from events which, by their nature or 
origin, are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and are 
beyond its actual control.  








63. It is important to point out that the compensation payable to a passenger under Article 7(1) of 
Regulation No 261/2004 may be reduced by 50% if the conditions laid down in Article 7(2) of the 
regulation are met. Even though the latter provision refers only to the case of re-routing of 
passengers, the Court finds that the reduction in the compensation provided for is dependent solely 
on the delay to which passengers are subject, so that nothing precludes the application mutatis 
mutandis of that provision to compensation paid to passengers whose flights are delayed. It follows 
that the compensation payable to a passenger whose flight is delayed, who reaches his final 
destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally scheduled, may be reduced by 50%, 
in accordance with Article 7(2)(c) of Regulation No 261/2004, where the delay is – in the case of a 
flight not falling under points (a) or (b) of Article 7(2) – less than four hours. 
 
~*~ 
Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 
 
Right to compensation 
 
1. Where reference is made to this Article, passengers shall receive compensation amounting to: 
 
(a) EUR 250 for all flights of 1500 kilometres or less; 
 
(b) EUR 400 for all intra-Community flights of more than 1500 kilometres, and for all other flights 
between 1500 and 3500 kilometres; 
 
(c) EUR 600 for all flights not falling under (a) or (b). 
 
In determining the distance, the basis shall be the last destination at which the denial of boarding or 
cancellation will delay the passenger's arrival after the scheduled time. 
 
2. When passengers are offered re-routing to their final destination on an alternative flight pursuant to 
Article 8, the arrival time of which does not exceed the scheduled arrival time of the flight originally 
booked 
 
(a) by two hours, in respect of all flights of 1500 kilometres or less; or 
 
(b) by three hours, in respect of all intra-Community flights of more than 1500 kilometres and for all 
other flights between 1500 and 3500 kilometres; or 
 
(c) by four hours, in respect of all flights not falling under (a) or (b), 
 
the operating air carrier may reduce the compensation provided for in paragraph 1 by 50%. 
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Annex 2. Average European inflation rates. 
 
The table below shows the annual average rate of inflationary change (%) for the European Union 
(changing composition), for 2010 to 2014. The value cited is the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP), designed for international comparisons of consumer price inflation. It is used by the 
European Central Bank for monitoring inflation in the Economic and Monetary Union and is sourced 
from eurostat: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00118&plugin=1 (accessed 01MAY15) 
 
 
Average European inflation rates 
Year Inflation rate (%) 
2014 compound  
rate on 2012 (%) 
2014 compound  
rate on 2010 (%) 
2010 2.1   
2011 3.1   
2012 2.6   
2013 1.5   
2014 0.6 3.1 8.8 
 
Source: eurostat (2015).  
 
For the compound rates (used in the main text), half the total annual values are used for the base and 
target years, as a crude method of producing mid-year estimates. 
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Annex 3. Seat, load factor and passenger allocations. 
 
Aircraft seats for the 15 supported aircraft have been reviewed using Innovata global seats file (2010 
data). The typical seating ranges (excluding outliers) are shown in the table below. 
 





 Allocated seats  
Low2 Base3 High4 
B733 116-148 148 134 134 
B734 134-168 168 152 152 
B735 96-132 132 119 119 
B738 144-189 189 171 171 
B752 160-232 232 209 209 
B763 192-270 270 243 230 
B744 275-436 436 393 371 
A319 118-156 156 141 141 
A320 136-180 180 162 162 
A321 169-220 220 198 198 
AT43 42-50 50 45 45 
AT72 62-72 72 65 65 
DH8D 70-78 78 71 71 
E190 93-106 106 96 96 
A332 211-303 303 273 258 
1 Typical seat range for the global fleet 2010 (Innovata); aircraft with unusual seat configurations excluded. 
2 Low cost scenario seats allocated using 100% of the maximum typical number of seats. 
3 Base cost scenario seats allocated using 90% of the maximum typical number of seats. 
4 High cost scenario seats allocated using 90/85% (narrow/wide-bodies) of the maximum typical number of seats 
 
Small differences are observed between the previous reporting for EUROCONTROL (Cook and 
Tanner, 2011) and the updated typical seat ranges. These changes can be explained by a new more 
rigorous selection process, i.e. excluding a greater number of unusual configurations (e.g. 
disregarding B734 ‘quick change’ and B744 ‘combi’ airframes fitted with only 72 and 275 seats 
respectively), and intervening airline fleet composition changes. The notable changes comprise an 
increase in the minimum number of A319, A320 and A321 seats (an additional 36, 26 and 20 seats 
respectively) and a decrease in the maximum number of B763 and B744 seats (reduced by 58 and 38 
seats). 
Low, base and high cost scenario seats have been allocated using the maximum typical number of 
seats per aircraft type; the low cost scenario having the maximum number of seats to reflect a single-
class cabin configuration. From this, 90% of the maximum number of seats has been allocated to the 
base and high cost scenarios to allow for business- and economy-class seating. The widebody high 
cost seating scenario has been allocated using 85% of the maximum number of seats (i.e. three-class 
layout). (In contrast, the previous (ibid.) seat allocation was based on 100%, 85% and 85%/75% for 
low, base and high cost scenarios.) It should also be noted that in some cases, a change in the 
number of allocated seats has an effect on the modelled crew costs carried out in parallel (requiring 
±1 flight attendant if the cabin crew to seat threshold is crossed). 
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Low, base and high cost scenario passenger loadings have been allocated using scenario-specific 
load factors. The starting point is an 80% average load factor covering 2014. This average is based 
on industry load factors published by AEA (80.4% derived from ‘total scheduled’ monthly average load 
factors) and IATA (79.7% ‘total market’) (AEA, 2015; IATA, 2015). Passengers have been allocated to 
the low cost scenario using a load factor of 65% (an increase from the 60% used with the previous 
(ibid.) delay cost model) and to the high cost scenario using 95% (up from 90% previously). 
Narrowbody base cost scenario passengers have been allocated using the industry average 80% with 
the corresponding widebody passengers from an 85% load factor (both up from 75% and 80% 
previously). The table below shows the final allocation for each aircraft type. 
 
Allocated passenger loadings by scenario 
ICAO aircraft 
designation 
 Allocated passengers  
Low1 Base2 High3 
B733 96 107 127 
B734 109 122 144 
B735 86 95 113 
B738 123 137 162 
B752 151 167 199 
B763 176 207 219 
B744 283 334 352 
A319 101 113 134 
A320 117 130 154 
A321 143 158 188 
AT43 33 36 43 
AT72 47 52 62 
DH8D 51 57 67 
E190 69 77 91 
A332 197 232 245 
1 Low cost scenario passengers allocated using 65% load factor. 
2 Base cost scenario passengers allocated using 80% (narrowbodies) or 85% (widebodies) load factor. 
3 High cost scenario passengers allocated using 95% load factor. 
 
Compared with the previously reported (ibid.) values, almost all passenger allocations have 
increased. The net effect is that such passenger increases have added to the inflationary increases 
independently applied to the passenger hard and soft costs, when these are reported per aircraft type. 
Notable exceptions are decreases of 21 and 16 passengers for the low and base cost scenarios of 
the B763, respectively. This has resulted in a net decrease of 3% of the low cost scenario hard and 
soft passenger costs for this aircraft, and almost no change for the base scenario (i.e. the relatively 
small base scenario decrease in passengers on-board approximately off-sets the small inflationary 
increase per passenger). 
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Annex 4. Low and high hard cost scenario tabulations. 
 
Low cost scenario assumptions 
 
Departure delay duration low scenario estimated costs – 90% of passengers wait for flight 
Haul 
Departure delay duration  
≥ 2 hours ≥ 3 hours ≥ 4 hours ≥ 5 hours ≥ 10 hours ≥8 
Short haul €650% €650%  €2505% €650%  €2505%    €2650% €1550% €2505%    €26510% €21 €2505% €50 
Medium haul  €650%  €4005% €650%  €4005%    €3450% €1550% €4005%   €34510% €21 €4005% €50 
Long haul           €3005% €650%   €6005%  €11700% €1550% €6005% €117010% €21 €6005% €50 




Departure delay duration low scenario estimated costs – 10% passengers opt for refund 
 
Haul 
Departure delay duration  
≥ 2 hours ≥ 3 hours ≥ 4 hours ≥ 5 hours ≥ 10 hours ≥8 
Short haul €650% €650%  €2505% €650%  €2505%   €26590% €1550% €2505%    €26590% €21 €2505% €50 
Medium haul  €650%  €4005% €650%  €4005%   €34590% €1550% €4005%   €34590% €21 €4005% €50 
Long haul           €3005% €650%  €6005% €117090% €1550% €6005% €117090% €21 €6005% €50 
 Key: Care, reimbursement, compensation, accommodation  
 
 
Key assumption changes relative to base cost scenario 
Setting Low cost assumption Base cost assumption 
Rates of compensation paid 5% 11% 
Passengers waiting for flight (instead of refund) 90% 80% 
Passengers rebooked on other carrier at 5-10 hours  0% 10% 
Passengers rebooked on other carrier beyond 10 hours 10% 50% 
Care provision at 2-10 hours  50% 80% 
Statistical accommodation cost (see main text) €50 €65 
Passengers on-board scenario (see Annex 3) Low Base 
 
Departure delay duration per passenger costs by length of haul (low cost scenario) 
 2 hours 3 hours 4 hours 5 hours 10 hours 
Short haul 3 16 16 44 131 
Medium haul 0 23 23 59 153 
Long haul 0 15 33 143 312 
Euros (2014). 
 
Average cost relative to base scenario = 42%. 
  
The cost of passenger delay to airlines in Europe Edition 2   
Consultation document 
37 of 38 
 




High cost scenario assumptions 
 
Departure delay duration high scenario estimated costs – 75% of passengers wait for flight 
Haul 
Departure delay duration  
≥ 2 hours ≥ 3 hours ≥ 4 hours ≥ 5 hours ≥ 10 hours ≥8 
Short haul €685% €685%  €25015% €685%  €25015%   €26515% €1585% €25015%    €26560% €21 €25015% €75 
Medium haul  €685%  €40015% €685%  €40015%   €34515% €1585% €40015%   €34560% €21 €40015% €75 
Long haul           €30015% €685%   €60015% €117015% €1585% €60015% €117060% €21 €60015% €75 




Departure delay duration high scenario estimated costs – 25% passengers opt for refund 
 
Haul 
Departure delay duration  
≥ 2 hours ≥ 3 hours ≥ 4 hours ≥ 5 hours ≥ 10 hours ≥8 
Short haul €685% €685%  €25015% €685%  €25015%   €26590% €1585% €25015%    €26590% €21 €25015% €75 
Medium haul  €685%  €40015% €685%  €40015%   €34590% €1585% €40015%   €34590% €21 €40015% €75 
Long haul           €30015% €685%  €60015% €117090% €1585% €60015% €117090% €21 €60015% €75 
 Key: Care, reimbursement, compensation, accommodation  
 
 
Key assumption changes relative to base cost scenario 
Setting High cost assumption Base cost assumption 
Rates of compensation paid 15% 11% 
Passengers waiting for flight (instead of refund) 75% 80% 
Passengers rebooked on other carrier at 5-10 hours  15% 10% 
Passengers rebooked on other carrier beyond 10 hours 60% 50% 
Care provision at 2-10 hours  85% 80% 
Statistical accommodation cost (see main text) €75 €65 
Passengers on-board scenario (see Annex 3) High Base 
 
Departure delay duration per passenger costs by length of haul (high cost scenario) 
 2 hours 3 hours 4 hours 5 hours 10 hours 
Short haul 5 43 43 140 312 
Medium haul 0 65 65 189 389 
Long haul 0 45 95 498 976 
Euros (2014). 
 
Average cost relative to base scenario = 123%. 
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Total passenger costs by delay duration and aircraft type (low cost scenario) 
Delay 
(mins) 
5 15 30 60 90 120 180 240 300 
B733 20 130 470 1 680 3 440 5 690 11 550 19 130 28 330 
B734 20 150 540 1 900 3 910 6 460 13 120 21 720 32 170 
B735 20 120 420 1 500 3 080 5 100 10 350 17 140 25 380 
B738 20 170 610 2 150 4 410 7 290 14 800 24 510 36 300 
B752 30 210 740 2 640 5 420 8 950 18 170 30 090 44 560 
B763 30 250 870 3 070 6 310 10 430 21 180 35 080 51 940 
B744 60 400 1 400 4 940 10 150 16 780 34 050 56 400 83 510 
A319 20 140 500 1 760 3 620 5 990 12 150 20 130 29 810 
A320 20 160 580 2 040 4 200 6 940 14 080 23 320 34 530 
A321 30 200 710 2 500 5 130 8 480 17 210 28 500 42 200 
AT43 10 50 160 580 1 180 1 960 3 970 6 580 9 740 
AT72 10 70 230 820 1 690 2 790 5 660 9 370 13 870 
DH8D 10 70 250 890 1 830 3 020 6 140 10 160 15 050 
E190 10 100 340 1 200 2 470 4 090 8 300 13 750 20 360 





Total passenger costs by delay duration and aircraft type (high cost scenario) 
Delay 
(mins) 
5 15 30 60 90 120 180 240 300 
B733 50 370 1 310 4 750 9 740 15 940 31 900 52 410 77 190 
B734 60 420 1 490 5 390 11 040 18 070 36 170 59 420 87 520 
B735 50 330 1 170 4 230 8 660 14 180 28 390 46 630 68 680 
B738 60 470 1 670 6 060 12 420 20 330 40 690 66 850 98 460 
B752 80 580 2 050 7 450 15 260 24 970 49 990 82 120 120 950 
B763 90 630 2 260 8 190 16 790 27 480 55 010 90 370 133 100 
B744 140 1 020 3 630 13 170 26 990 44 170 88 420 145 250 213 940 
A319 50 390 1 380 5 010 10 270 16 820 33 660 55 290 81 440 
A320 60 450 1 590 5 760 11 810 19 330 38 680 63 550 93 600 
A321 70 540 1 940 7 030 14 410 23 590 47 230 77 580 114 260 
AT43 20 120 440 1 610 3 300 5 400 10 800 17 740 26 130 
AT72 20 180 640 2 320 4 750 7 780 15 570 25 580 37 680 
DH8D 30 190 690 2 510 5 140 8 410 16 830 27 650 40 720 
E190 40 260 940 3 400 6 980 11 420 22 860 37 550 55 310 
A332 100 710 2 530 9 170 18 780 30 750 61 540 101 100 148 900 
Euros (2014). 
 
